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Abstract What is the meaning of perestrojka? There is no doubt that it led to the
end of the Cold War and had a huge impact on the international situation. Never-
theless, there is no consensus as to the outcomes of perestrojka. Perestrojka brought
about the collapse of the Soviet Union. This fact might be interpreted positively: it
opened the possibility to restore historical truth and to create independent demo-
cratic states. From another perspective, it can be conceived negatively as a
destruction of the integrity of the Soviet Union and the loss of a part of the territory
as well as the economy of Russia (according to the President of the Gorbacˇev
Foundation, Viktor Kuvaldin, during the conference ‘‘Revisiting Perestroika—
Processes and Alternatives’’). Perestrojka has no one definite general meaning, but
it has a very specific one for Lithuania. In this paper I ask: What is the meaning of
perestrojka for contemporary Lithuania and for post-Soviet life? Was perestrojka a
failure or a success? I approach perestrojka from a moral point of view, suggesting
that the perestrojka made possible a fundamental choice between several alterna-
tives. Once the choice was made the specificity of future goals and evaluation of the
past opened up. I concentrate on the moral value of the act of accommodation (and
resistance) to the Soviet regime, on the conflict of values represented by the
‘‘nation’s own’’ and the goodness of the political order, and on the role of freedom
and determinism in history. Immanuel Kant’s conception of duty and the categorical
imperative is used as a model for the analysis of the situation of choice.
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The Lithuanian case of perestrojka
In the case of Lithuania perestrojka has a double-edged meaning. It is conceived as
a chain of initiatives that gave incentive to the declaration of independence. On the
other hand, the reactions to the events in Lithuania revealed that the initiators of
perestrojka did not anticipate this kind of scenario. So perestrojka has no specific
positive meaning in the Lithuanian self-consciousness. It signifies only the totality
of processes that took place in the Soviet Union. The latter was an ‘‘alien’’ country
in the sense that it was imposed upon Lithuanians. The political processes in
Moscow led to the so-called times of ‘‘our own’’ Rebirth (Atgimimas).
In June 1988 an initiative group of 35 persons in Vilnius established the
‘‘Lithuanian Reform Movement ‘Sa˛ju¯dis’’’ (Lietuvos Persitvarkymo Sa˛ju¯dis).1 The
word ‘‘reform’’ referred directly to the idea of perestrojka, and at the beginning the
movement itself was supported by the Lithuanian Communist Party. In October
1988 the first congress of ‘‘Sa˛ju¯dis’’ took place. Many nice speeches were delivered,
but most were not very concrete and some were very cautious. Nevertheless the
objective of the Reform Movement was clearly posed: it was Lithuanian Rebirth.
Views concerning the content of the Rebirth differed markedly and it was not
clearly conceptualized. The most popular Soviet-Lithuanian poet, Justinas Marc-
inkevicˇius, greeted those assembled with rather abstract words: ‘‘The day has come
to at last unite our civil and political will, our intellectual and creative resources, all
our bodily and spiritual power—to unite for the rebirth of our Lithuania’’ (Lietuvos
Persitvarkymo Sa˛ju¯dis 1990, p. 7). It is no surprise that other participants of the
congress spoke more concretely, although with the help of metaphors. Arvydas
Juozaitis called for the ‘‘renewal of the life of the state no longer controlled by
vandals’’ and stressed that liberty and Lithuania are two inseparable words with the
same initial (Lietuvos Persitvarkymo Sa˛ju¯dis 1990, p. 21). Even Vytautas
Landsbergis, future leader of the movement for independence, spoke in rather
poetic words: ‘‘We shall believe—we’ll make, we’ll reform life and ourselves,
Lithuania will bloom like a flower and will adorn the garland of the world’’
(Lietuvos Persitvarkymo Sa˛ju¯dis 1990, p. 29). No direct word of an ‘‘independent
Lithuania’’ had been spoken. Nevertheless Marcinkevicˇius and the others spoke
about ‘‘our newest history’’2 or ‘‘our Lithuania’’ that was implicitly opposed to
‘‘Moscow’s Lithuania’’. Evidently from the beginning ‘‘our Rebirth’’ was tacitly
contrasted to the ‘‘Soviet perestrojka.’’ The question as to the moral values on which
‘‘our Lithuania’’ was to be based was too premature for the congress.
Further events led to a clearer definition of the purpose of ‘‘our own’’ reforms,
which means the independence of the state. The turning point was the electoral
program of Sa˛ju¯dis proclaimed on the third of February 1990. It was declared that
Sa˛ju¯dis’ candidates aim was ‘‘to reestablish the independent democratic state of
Lithuania’’ (Gruzdyt _e 1990, p. 5) There was not a hint of the rhetoric of the former
1 For a comprehensive study in the early history of Sa˛ju¯dis: (Senn 1990).
2 Romualdas Ozolas spoke about ‘‘our newest history’’ that will follow behind the ongoing ‘‘Revolution
of the Rebirth’’ (Lietuvos Persitvarkymo Sa˛ju¯dis 1990, p. 17).
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program of October 1988 that talked about the relations between the Lithuanian
SSR and other republics regulated by Lenin’s principles of federalism.
The document ‘‘corrected’’ the name of the movement according to its new
mission: in the future it would no longer be called ‘‘Reform Movement Sa˛ju¯dis’’,
but simply ‘‘Sa˛ju¯dis’’ or ‘‘Lithuanian Sa˛ju¯dis’’. Sa˛ju¯dis took up the flag of the
movement for Lithuanian state independence. Its ideas acquired moral superiority
over Soviet ideology, and its leaders received much more public support than the
agents of old-type local governance. In the elections of February 24, 1990
candidates of Sa˛ju¯dis gained the majority (72 among the 90 elected) in the Supreme
Council.
The underlying meaning of Mikhail Gorbacˇev’s reforms came to the fore for
Lithuanians on January 13, 1991, when soldiers of the Soviet Omon (Interior
Ministry troops, Black Berets) attacked the TV tower in Vilnius. From the
Lithuanian viewpoint at that moment it was clear that the objective of perestrojka
was not to create principles for a new and freer order. Perestrojka eventually
showed itself to be only a series of slogans embellishing the old regime. Soviet
perestrojka was interpreted as an effort by the central government to mollify the
regime and to preserve the integrity of the empire at the same time. In the context,
the Lithuanian Rebirth was interpreted as a consequence of an effort to make the
bare slogans of perestrojka reality: not to stand halfway, but to move forward to the
end. According to the retrospective assessment of Vytautas Landsbergis: ‘‘The
answer of Lithuanians at the time was as follows: Gentlemen, we don’t agree with
30% of freedom! Ladies, we are not satisfied with partial perestrojka! Complete
reform—perestrojka to the end—means freedom of choice for everybody and for
every country’’(Landsbergis 2000, p. 83). From his point of view Soviet perestrojka
aimed at preserving the superficially reformed empire by handing over the property
of the state to the nomenclature of the Communist Party and legitimizing its
authority by a false referendum for the future ‘‘new union’’ (Landsbergis 2004, 63f).
William Urban points out that ‘‘Gorbachev had hoped to use the Baltic nations as
models of perestrojka, thereby saving communism from its internal decay. When he
saw his mistake, he changed course immediately, subsequently allying himself with
that odd mixture of old-fashioned communists, frightened bureaucrats, authoritarian
colonels, and Russian nationalists’’ (Urban 1992, p. 151).
The Lithuanian Rebirth disclosed moral dilemmas which demanded solutions in
order to turn away from the past and towards Lithuania’s future. It stimulated the
urge to draw a new line between ‘‘our own’’ and what is ‘‘alien,’’ to give an
unequivocal definition of freedom and subjugation, of democracy and a centralized
regime, truth and falsehood, good and evil. Here I deal with three of these: firstly,
with the moral value of the act of accommodation (and resistance) to the Soviet
regime; secondly, with the question of the conflict of values represented by the
‘‘nation’s own’’ and the goodness of the political order; thirdly, with the question of
the role of freedom and determinism in history. I will rely on Immanuel Kant’s
conception of moral law, duty and freedom in his Grounding for the Metaphysics of
Morals as a model for the analysis of these points.
Kant identifies the moral value of action with reference to its end. One has to
constantly keep in mind the compatibility of the particular action with free will that
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determines the duties of the human being qua person. Kant indicates a kind of two-
step reflection. Firstly, one needs to apprehend the ultimate subjective end and
motive of his/her action, the maxim: ‘‘A maxim contains the practical rule which
reason determines in accordance with the conditions of the subject (often his
ignorance or his inclinations) and is thus the principle according to which the
subject does act. But the law is the objective principle valid for every rational being,
and it is the principle according to which he ought to act, i.e., an imperative’’ (Kant
1981, 30f). Secondly, the action has to be compared with the objective moral law.
The steps of moral self-reflection assist in understanding proper motives, the real
moral value of one’s actions, and the degree of one’s personal weakness in seeking
moral ends. The act of self-reflection is of highest significance in Kant’s moral
theory, because it helps to identify moral duties and the subjective contribution to
morality.
On the one hand, Kant, in a formal and a positive way, formulates the moral
law, which has the form of an imperative concerning personal motives for
action: ‘‘Hence there is only one categorical imperative and it is this: Act only
according to that maxim whereby you can at the same time will that it should
become a universal law’’ (Kant 1981, p. 30). On the other hand, he reveals the
negative side of the practical content of the universal law. The restrictive factor
applying to action entails treatment of every human being—a person—as an end
in itself: ‘‘The practical imperative will therefore be the following: Act in such a
way that you treat humanity, whether in your own person or in the person of
another, always at the same time as an end and never simply as a means’’ (Kant
1981, p. 36). Both elements of the moral law are very important in order to
understand the essence of Kant’s conception of morality. After all, there may
well be attractive ends whose realisation would require treating some human
beings as mere means.
Kant also indicates that it is impossible to judge a particular action ‘‘from
outside’’: ‘‘We like to flatter ourselves with the false claim to a more noble
motive; but in fact we can never, even by the strictest examination, completely
plumb the secret of incentives of our actions. For when moral value is being
considered, the concern is not with the actions, which are seen, but rather with
their inner principles, which are not seen’’ (Kant 1981, p. 19). This element of
morality reveals it to be a kind of subjective (rational) belief requiring personal
practical devotion. It may likewise induce the rejection of the objectivity of this
kind of morality, the transcendental reality of moral law, and the possibility of
free will as such. This doubtful condition of Kant’s moral law shows that morality
is deeply rooted in the freedom of the will. It is subjectively possible to renounce
the existence of the free will as well as the necessity of personal reflection on the
intrinsic value of actions.
Kant’s conception of morality is a fruitful tool with which to evaluate the (post-)
Soviet situation. There are, on the one hand, numerous diaries and autobiographies
of the agents of Soviet epoch. They reveal personal attitudes towards the subjective
motives of their actions. Secondly, these individuals make explicit claims to a moral
stand and free will during the Soviet times.
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The moral side of accommodation and collaboration
The ability to accommodate to a particular society constitutes the essence of
socialization. Education and upbringing are necessary to help individuals live with
others and follow common rules. Social life is not only a human necessity, but also a
condition for the construction of individual identity. Under normal conditions, those
who are unable to accommodate to the social system need to be educated, instructed
or, in some extreme cases, isolated from society.
The problem with Soviet existence had to do with the fact that the world and
society were not ‘‘normal’’ in the moral and political sense. The Soviet morality that
prevailed in daily social practices was not a normal morality in regard to basic moral
demands. On the one hand, it claimed that it protected many basic norms of
morality. On the other hand, the conditions of daily life and the operations of the
state incited people to violate such moral rules as not to steal, not to lie, or not to
betray. Eventually in daily life practices of betrayal, lying, stealing, and distortion of
other values were considered a ‘‘normal’’ thing. Soviet reality and its ‘‘normality’’
were morally distorted. Totalitarian rule had pushed people to accommodate to this
reality and to seek moral reasons and practical ways to live in it.
Aristotle demarcates true from perverted forms of government by their
correspondence to human nature: ‘‘for there is by nature both a justice and an
advantage appropriate to the rule of a master, another to kingly rule, another to
constitutional rule; but there is none naturally appropriate to tyranny, or to any other
perverted form of government; for these come into being contrary to nature’’
(Aristotle 2007). The core of the contradiction between the deformed order and
human nature consists in the tension between being a good man and being a good
citizen.
The Soviet order contradicted human nature in the Aristotelian sense. If we
assume that attributes of ‘‘normality’’ must be inherent to concrete reality, actions
and social rules, which should correspond to an individual’s striving for freedom,
dignity, and the good, then the Soviet order presented an entirely opposite picture.3
In different circumstances it would be possible to reject the abnormal requirements;
yet Soviet experience was imposed on people by violence and maintained by fear.
Therefore, the question of accommodation (or resistance) was a question of radical
choice.
In 1940, the Soviet world invaded Lithuania as a world of an ‘‘alien’’ order. It
was conceived as ‘out of the ordinary’ in a societal and political sense. Because of
violence and repressions, Lithuanians could not carry on with their customary life.
Following the Second World War some students in Kaunas endeavored to continue
3 One of the forms of ‘‘abnormality’’ was antagonism and hatred of ‘‘other’’ people, though these were
basic for Soviet solidarization and socialization .The image of the enemy, whoever he may be (an
American capitalist or an interior resistor) was constructed from repulsive features. Hatred, intolerance,
and hostility towards persons confessing other world-views were part of the essence of the ideology. Oda
Beckmann and Sven H. Koch have carried out interesting investigations into the character of Soviet
caricature. They state that caricature was not destined to entertain. On the contrary, it had to agitate,
mobilize to the struggle, and cultivate hostile thinking: ‘‘Its essential feature is acrimony and
aggressiveness, not comicality and humor’’ (Beckmann and Koch 1977, p. 8).
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their studies. Nevertheless, due to compulsory recruitment into the Soviet army as
well as numerous arrests, many young people had no other resort but to flee to
forests and join partisan troops (Girnius 1987, pp. 114–115).
The so-called Khrusˇcˇev era separated two periods of Soviet experience. They
differed in their values and in officially accepted limits of freedom. In Stalin’s
times, the question of accommodation was a question of life and death. In the
context of prevailing terror even those Lithuanians who did not collaborate looked
for means to accommodate to this abnormal and alien world. Their motives were to
survive, experience as little repression as possible, and create an at least bearable
daily existence.
In late Soviet Lithuania, people mastered various strategies of accommodation to
make the abnormal look like ‘‘normal.’’ Many illegal and immoral ways to provide
for one’s family, practices of procurement such as blat or the ‘‘buddy-system’’, and
a kind of ‘‘Delphic’’ speaking (or ‘‘talking in Aesopian manner’’ as Lithuanian
intellectuals called it) were invented and practiced as substitutes to make up for
shortages and the absence of free speech (Putinait _e 2007, pp. 160–201). In the last
decade of the regime, the futility of Soviet existence came to expression, as well as
distrust in the ‘‘truths’’ of Soviet propaganda.
The conditions of freedom varied in every decade. It is necessary to draw a line
between the compromises with one’s conscience as an existential necessity and
accommodation for the sake of slightly better daily living conditions, when one
harms others for the award of a car or holiday travel. Specific goods take the place
of the good, and accommodation takes the form of reconciliation with the Soviet
way of life. As historian Nijol _e Gasˇkait _e points out: ‘‘One decade of murderous
terror sufficed for relative threat to become an inherent companion in our lives. The
relative threat brought it about that accommodation out of displeasing necessity
became a tempting habit’’ (Gasˇkait _e 1996, p. 156).
An act or the practice of collaboration could well be presented as selfless
dedication to society, the good of the people and the nation. At present, Lithuania is
attempting to justify the practice of Soviet values and to seek moral rehabilitation
for the daily practices of Soviet Lithuania. During the last five years several
autobiographies and memoirs of influential former party leaders and security
officers were published, including those by the former deputy Minister of Culture
Vytautas Jakelaitis (Jakelaitis 2002), the Party functionary Algis Samajauskas
(Samajauskas 2005), the former member of the Central Committee of Lithuanian
Communist Party (LCP) Vilius Kazanavicˇius (Kazanavicˇius 2005), the former
Minister of Culture and secretary of LCP Lionginas Sˇepetys (Sˇepetys 2005), the
former KGB officer Ricˇardas Vaigauskas (Vaigauskas 2005), the former Secretary
of the Central Committee of LCP Vytautas Astrauskas (Astrauskas 2006), and the
former Secretary of LCP Algirdas Brazauskas (Brazauskas 2007).
The former functionaries present their service to the regime as a duty to protect
the Lithuanian nation and society from bad leaders and disruptive orders of the
central government (Astrauskas 2006, p. 45). The former functionaries claim to
have done their duty to create in Lithuania a ‘‘good’’ or ‘‘homey’’ version of the
regime. They interpret their collaborative actions as the only way to achieve the
good in these particular conditions. They pretend to have protected decency and
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humaneness for the good of the people (Jakelaitis 2002, p. 214). They interpret their
former position as a kind of devotion to others, and not to their own individual
prosperity. It is typical to underscore Lithuania’s economic ‘‘achievements’’ during
the Soviet years. Vilius Kazanavicˇius even states that Soviet Lithuania reached the
level of the world’s developed economies (Kazanavicˇius 2005, p. 243). It is
certainly true that in Soviet times the economy did make some progress. However,
the cost of the achievement was brutal exploitation of the people and the country. It
was attained not thanks to the regime, but in spite of it.
The arguments target the conclusion that it was good to collaborate with the
regime and to seek a constant moral compromise for the sake of other advantages.
The former functionaries also argue that had they not done their duties, Lithuania’s
economy would have been much more miserable and society more suppressed
(Brazauskas 1992, p. 120; Samajauskas 2005, p. 184). Sometimes it is even affirmed
that the confrontation of certain groups and persons with the Soviet order had done
or would have done damage to the well being of the whole nation (Sabonis 1992, p.
371). There is no doubt that there is a duty to do one’s job well. However in the
conditions of a bad order, this duty might oblige some to deceive others, thus
distorting their world-view, as could have been the case with teachers and writers.
It might be suggested that in many cases accommodation and collaboration were
inevitable. This kind of accommodation can be regarded as duty when the life and
the security of one’s family are under threat. But is it still a duty when it involves
betrayal of others and destruction of basic principles of humanity? On the other
hand, is accommodation to an immoral system still a duty when the incentive is no
longer a real threat but desire for a materially better existence?
From the moral point of view, the ability to accommodate to the given Soviet
situation should not be taken as a virtue or a moral advantage. It is usual to speak
about the heroism of resistance. On the other hand, ‘‘the heroism of accommoda-
tion’’ is a concept that is hard to explain. At best we might evaluate the necessity
and the limits of accommodation for lives led in conditions of a bad socio-political
order. From a moral perspective these two strategies are not equally attractive.
The question of accommodation and collaboration bears on the duty to preserve
one’s life and the security of one’s family, to carry out one’s job well, to be a moral
person, and to dissociate oneself from immoral practices. The abnormality of the
Soviet situation caused very sharp contradictions among these duties and brought
about a kind of ‘‘moral oblivion.’’ To make the moral side of the situation clearer, at
least in some aspects, it is useful to refer again to Kant’s universal law and the
imperative to treat humanity in our own person ‘‘always at the same time as an end
and never simply as a means.’’
Soviet ideology presented a kind of ‘‘half-morality’’ in Kant’s sense. The Soviet
order was legitimized by the goal to build Communism. The latter was the only
criterion to justify the actions of the Communist party and its members. It was the
absolute end requiring the ultimate sacrifice of people. To foster the progress
towards Communism extreme devotion was required from the Party members as
leaders of the society. According to the basic ideology, they had to consider
themselves ‘‘simply as a means’’ to the end. The former Lithuanian leaders
sometimes reflect on their situation as having been that of ‘‘hostages’’ (Sˇepetys
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1992, p. 378). It is entirely possible that a part of the Soviet nomenclature deeply
wanted that the goal of Communism ‘‘should become a universal law.’’ They
honestly could believe that the vices of the system resulted from the lack of faith.
This ‘‘ideal’’ end and not a mere wish for privileges could well urge them to
collaborate and fight any manifestation of distrust in Soviet truths. Some really tried
to protect people from vicious lies, but they did not accept that the state’s end itself
was morally wicked.
The moral problem here consisted in the fact that the end of Communism eliminated
the moral end, the specific treatment and cultivation of one’s person and the others.
Kant states that: ‘‘Persons are, therefore, not merely subjective ends whose existence
as an effect of our actions has a value for us; but such beings are objective ends, i.e.,
exist as end in themselves. Such an end is one for which there can be substituted no
other end to which such beings should serve merely as means, for otherwise nothing at
all of absolute value would be found anywhere’’ (Kant 1981, p. 36).
The case is very similar with the people who didn’t devote their lives to the end
of Communism, thought they sacrificed their moral ends to accommodation for the
sake of goods and more comfortable living conditions. They accepted prevailing
social habits and the practical circumstances as decisive for their actions and
choices. In both cases we face the situation of limited reflection of the motives of
action that are not suitable as an argument for moral justification. The consequences
of impure moral reasoning, according to Kant, are usually bad: ‘‘a mixed moral
philosophy, compounded both of incentives drawn from feelings and inclinations
and at the same time of rational concepts, must make the mind waver between
motives that cannot be brought under any principle and that can only by accident
lead to the good, but often can also lead to the bad’’ (Kant 1981, p. 22).
The actions that lead to any ‘‘good’’ end may be understood as obligations
requiring personal effort, dedication, and decency. On the other hand, such ends do
not exclude treating others as mere means. This is the case with the ‘‘nation’s good’’
that as an anti-Soviet end is opposed to the ideologically imposed end of
Communism. The argument of the ‘‘nation as the good’’ is often used in post-Soviet
discourse to justify collaborative actions and therefore needs closer analysis.
Between ‘‘the nation as the good’’ and the good
There is no doubt that to identify oneself with the nation constitutes an important
part of human identity. There is a moral duty to do one’s best and even sacrifice
some personal interests for the sake of the nation and nationally based solidarity. On
the other hand, the nation itself is not an ultimate good. The solidarity of the nation
is not an absolute good that could justify any means chosen for its sake. At the start
of Lithuanian independence the need to define the ends and the good for the future
required defining the limits of duty to the nation. This problem was and remains
more than a matter of mere theoretical or historical interest. Its solution is of
ultimate significance to the moral evaluation of choices and daily practices.
The idea of the rebirth of the nation in the 1980s presented two different
nationally-based prospects. On the one hand, it meant a kind of autonomous order
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ruled by the local Lithuanian nomenclature that would have operated independently
from Moscow in economic, cultural, and other spheres. This kind of sovereignty
would have enabled freedom from restraint on the part of the central authority. It
was a project of a group of local functionaries who wanted to strengthen their power
and keep alive a Soviet-type regime with elements of democracy. To go this way
would have meant establishing a partially independent and at the same time
‘‘Soviet’’ Lithuania. Independence in this sense would have been independence or
autonomy of the ‘‘Lithuanian’’ authority from its ‘‘Russian’’ counterpart. The
Lithuanian ‘‘state’’ would have been based not on democratic principles but on
national identity and ‘‘national’’ leaders. The discussion concerning ‘‘autonomy
versus independence’’ was very intense during the month of the economic blockade
by Russia following the announcement of independence in March 1990.
On the other hand, the idea of the independence of Lithuania could have been,
and eventually was, related to the future of Lithuania as an independent democratic
state, based on historical truth and disclosure of historical injustice. Choosing this
way meant separation from the Soviet Union not as an order of ‘‘Russians’’ but as a
totalitarian state that had occupied Lithuania.
The dissociation between ‘‘our own’’ and the ‘‘alien’’ was based on democratic
values and historical truth, as opposed to bare criterion of nationality. The course of
events showed that ‘‘our own’’ national-Soviet authority may (and must) be
qualified as ‘‘alien’’ as soon as its deeds are evaluated according to democratic
standards. During the Rebirth Lithuanian society had to decide between the two
possible alternatives of liberation.
The first model of political order was based on accommodation to a kind of
‘‘semi-truth’’ and avoidance of radical confrontation with the central government for
convenience’s sake. It was attractive to a part of the Lithuanian people, who wished
merely to be ruled by ‘‘their own’’ leaders. The most advantaged part of Soviet
society was not unconcerned with this turn of events. It would have preserved not
only the power of the ‘‘national’’, though Soviet, nomenclature, it would also have
guaranteed the stock privileges and political influence of certain social groups, such
as the so-called creative intelligentsia. It is not surprising that on July 31, 1990, 31
intellectuals signed a public letter entitled ‘‘Appeal to the people of Lithuania.’’ The
intellectuals urged new parliamentary elections. At the time this meant blocking
initiatives to reinforce de facto Lithuanian independence. Parliament was the source
of tension and discomfort between Vilnius and Moscow’s dissatisfied government.
The letter at the time was evaluated as the demonstration of loyalty to the old order
(Antanaitis 2006, p. 7).
In their autobiographies, the Soviet Lithuanian leaders give a specific version of
the course of events in Soviet Lithuania and their role in it. They present their
position as an act of free will in circumstances that were not to change. Following
this interpretation, the Soviet regime was not ‘‘bad’’: it was good in essence but
came to be spoiled by ‘‘bad’’ central leaders and wicked persons in general. They
supposed that the misery in Lithuania was caused by the invading Russians and not
by Lithuanian functionaries. The latter are assumed to have cheated ‘‘Russians’’ (the
Central government) in every way possible in order to protect Lithuanians (the
nation and themselves). Let me mention that the greatest ‘‘cheat’’ on the central
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government, carried out by First Secretary of the Lithuanian Communist Party,
Antanas Sniecˇkus, was in part an attempt to sabotage Khrusˇcˇev ‘‘corn initiative’’
(Astrauskas 2006, p. 45).
Vytautas Astrauskas was the secretary of the Central Committee for Agriculture.
During the Rebirth he was active as Chairman of the Presidium of the Soviet
Lithuanian Supreme Soviet that passed the law on democratic elections and
formally opened the door to the declaration of the independence of Lithuania. His
presence in the highest echelons of the Soviet nomenclature explains why in 1988
he still functioned as a very active Deputy Chairman of the Presidium of the Central
Supreme Soviet in Moscow. Recently, he gave his interpretation of the reasons for
the failure of perestrojka, that is, the collapse of Soviet Union.
Astrauskas visualizes a might-have-been scenario of perestrojka, which would
have increased the power of local authorities and eventually would have led to a
different course of events. All that would have been possible: ‘‘If Mikhail
Gorbachev, who started it, had undertaken decisive action. If a new and really
democratic Constitution had been formulated and adopted in 1985–1989, which
would have abandoned monopolistic power of the one party, decentralized the
economy and the administration, legalized various forms of ownership, reformed
the security and military structures, and composed a new treaty of the Union under
which every Republic could manage its own territory’’ (Astrauskas 2006, pp. 138–
139). Astrauskas thus underscores the value of an unimproved medium that would
have helped preserve a slightly reformed Soviet Union. His vision reflects the hopes
which the Soviet Lithuanian nomenclature cherished in regard to the perestrojka of
Gorbacˇev, and which eventually came to nothing.
The contemporary historian Aru¯nas Streikus draws attention to a kind of
revisionist view of the events of twentieth century Lithuanian history that was
anchored in public opinion and discourse at the end of 1980s. The view provided an
interpretation of the increasing number of opponents to the Soviet regime: the
deformation of socialism is said to account for the increase. Streikus notes that at
that time local authorities wished ‘‘to show that all decrees were sent from Moscow.
This gave birth to a myth that Moscow was guilty for all evils, while A. Sniecˇkus
and other leaders of the Lithuanian Communist Party (LCP) did their best to
alleviate the negative effects of the policy’’ (Streikus 2007, p. 20). This attitude to
reasons for the evils in Lithuania suggested that local-national communist
authorities, without orders from Moscow, would have been able to avoid the ills
of the regime on their own.
The slogans of national solidarity during the time of Rebirth often indicated a
wish to differentiate the ‘‘what is ours’’ and the ‘‘what is alien’’ by recourse to the
principle of nationality. This was formulated in a polarization of ‘‘Lithuanians’’
opposed to ‘‘Russians’’. Unofficially, the anti-Russian position during Soviet times
was synonymous with patriotism. It was anticipated at different levels of life in
Soviet Lithuania: in folk songs ‘‘in due course,’’ anecdotes, and the opposition of
local government to orders to strengthen the teaching of Russian language in the
schools at the expense of the Lithuanian. Perstrojka opened doors to the
spontaneous expressions of anti-Russian feelings that formerly were practiced in
the closed circle of family and intimate friends. For example, the concert organized
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by the folk group Mu¯za in Sˇiauliai in 1988 entitled ‘‘Do Lithuanians know how to
laugh?’’ The Lithuanian Ministry of Culture discussed the event in the highest level
and stated: ‘‘The show was of a very low ideological and artistic level. It escalated
nationalistic, anti-Russian tendencies, gratified the cheap taste of a part of the
audience’’ (Bagusˇauskas and Streikus 2005, p. 456). It is certainly true that
artistically the performance was very poor; still, the ‘‘anti-Russian’’ message
obviously fulfilled the expectations of the public.
The so-called ‘‘anti-Russian’’ position of Soviet Lithuanians was related to
understanding what it meant to be a Lithuanian. This understanding was partly
inherited from the pre-war Lithuanian identity. ‘‘Lithuanian-ity’’ was based on
ethnic Lithuanian territorial descent and the Lithuanian language. A Lithuanian was
a person who was (or his parents were) born in ethnic Lithuania and spoke the
Lithuanian language. The latter could be either native Lithuanian or re-acquired as
the mother tongue. The national language and the territory consolidated the nation.
For that reason, the Soviet policy of ‘‘internationalization’’ was understood as the
Russification of Lithuania.
In the Soviet Union there were constant attempts to mingle the nations, to settle
Russians in Lithuania, and to establish the inferior status of the Lithuanian language
in comparison to Russian. As poet Marcelijus Martinaitis remarked ironically in
1989: ‘‘According to the enforced idea of the ‘‘Soviet mother-country,’’ for a
Russian his own language can be his mother tongue everywhere, whereas for a
Lithuanian this is true only in Lithuania. Eventually, wherever he places his [the
Russian’s] foot, that is already his ‘‘mother-country’’ (hjquya). That’s how
bilingualism is derived: the Russian language has to be sovereign over the whole
territory of the USSR’’ (Martinaitis 2006, p. 154). The attitude towards the
settlement of Russians in Lithuania in a more radical way was expressed in the
‘‘Appeal to the Russians in Lithuania’’ by the dissident movement, the Lithuanian
League for Freedom (Lietuvos laisv _es lyga) in 1979. The appeal incited the Russians
to leave, because they were in danger: ‘‘The damage to Russian colonists is
observed and understood by our nation. Especially among the youth, this incites the
development of an anti-Russian climate, hatred’’ (Sˇidlauskas 2004, p. 137).
The tensions in the national background were in a sense ‘‘natural,’’ because of the
inequality of the situation of Russians and people of other nationalities, and the
(Russian-) nationalistic essence of the Soviet state. On the other hand, this kind of
tension instilled fear in Moscow. Take, for instance, Gorbacˇev’s visit to Vilnius in
January 1990. In several meetings with the population, he stressed the equality of
rights of people of all nationalities (Gorbacˇev 1995, s. 497). However paradoxical it
may seem, it was true that during the perestrojka the local Lithuanian functionaries
resorted to the rhetoric of nationalism more than Sa˛ju¯dis, which stressed principles
of democracy, truth, and freedom. Public incitements on the part the side of the
Lithuanian communists ‘‘not to disunite the nation’’ represented an invitation to
discard the claim to establish a new democratic state that would differ from the
autonomous Soviet Republic of Lithuania. The local communist leader Brazauskas
propagated a slow step-by-step policy that should have avoided bitter conflicts with
Moscow, within society, and among the political actors: ‘‘Our multy-party political
system is in the course of development, and traditions are only just forming; thus we
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must remain closely united during such a critical period for Lithuania’’ (Brazauskas
2004, p. 223).
It became evident that it would be impossible to create an independent
democratic state without dissociaing from local authority and its claims to preserve
effective power. Choosing such a value-orientation meant splitting Soviet-type
solidarity of the nation and bringing contradictions and conflicts into the political
and social life of the new Lithuania. On the other hand, it was an orientation that
could encourage the establishment of a close solidarity, indeed camaraderie with
representatives of other nations, even Russians who were pursuing democracy and
independence from the Soviet regime for their nation.
Either way of identifying the ‘‘aliens’’ and the ‘‘Russians’’ could easily reveal the
kind of goal Lithuanians were pursuing. On the surface it may appear that the
majority of Lithuanians in the Soviet Union disliked Russians more than Soviet rule.
This observation could lead to the conclusion that Lithuania’s turn to democracy
can be compared to a miracle. Non-nationalist solidarity obviously played a much
more significant role than could be expected.
The true solidarity of the nations affected by perestrojka can well be heard in the
words of the deputy of the Supreme Council of the Russian Federation, Konstantin
Nesterov, in March 1991, spoken before the Lithuanian Supreme Council: ‘‘Russia
understands that by supporting Lithuanian independence it is at the same time
struggling for its own independence and for the independence of all other nations in
the Soviet Union’’ (Landsbergis 2005, p. 7). The declaration of the independence of
Lithuania would have been certainly much more complicated and probably hardly
possible had there been no signs of solidarity from the functioning democracies in
the rest of the world.
The situation that Lithuanians faced at the beginning of the 1990s appears to
resemble the one that Remi Brague identifies as essentially ‘‘European.’’ Speaking
about the roots of the European self-consciousness, he stressed the difference
between what is ‘‘our own’’ and the ‘‘good.’’4 From his viewpoint, the pursuit of the
‘‘good’’ and self-perfection encouraged the Europeans of the Middle Ages to disown
their original German or Celtic ancestors. Instead of clinging to their authentic
progenitors and their primeval traditions, the old Europeans adopted the ancient
Romans as their genuine ancestors whose knowledge they had to learn and to master.
The post-Soviet situation makes it necessary to clarify the confusion between
‘‘what is our own’’ and ‘‘what is alien.’’ There is only one way to do this, viz., to
answer a question similar to Brague’s question about the ancestors of the Europeans.
Which value should be primary: nationality or a specific way of life? Lithuanian
nationality is based on fidelity to the heritage of ‘‘our own’’ ancestors, that is, on
solidarity with ‘‘our own Soviets.’’ The independence of the democratic state means
fidelity to a kind of political and cultural tradition that is qualified as ‘‘good,’’ in
comparison to the Soviet order.
At the beginning of the Soviet order and Soviet solidarity there was an
assumption that ‘‘ours’’ is identical with the ‘‘good.’’ This allowed justifying ‘‘our
own’’ evil as the proper good, and rejecting the good of aliens or ‘‘enemies’’ as the
4 Compare Remi Brague’s public lecture in Vilnius, 2-11-2006.
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proper evil. In the name of ‘‘our own,’’ the ‘‘good’’ as a primary principle or idea of
life was rejected.
Is the national idea subordinate to the good, or does the opposite relation hold?
The answer to this question is crucial for the current assessment of the Soviet epoch
and for the moral evaluation of choices, habits, and the kind of ‘‘morality’’ that
characterized the Soviet Lithuanian. Nationality is an important part of human
identity; therefore, activity in the name of the nation can in no way be rejected as
bad. On the other hand, it is clear that this can hardly be the criterion for
determining the good.
If it is decided that the unity of the nation is more important, then ways will be
found to justify Soviet collaboration and all kinds of immoral practices to which the
regime gave rise. In that case the starting point would be the conviction that
collaboration is less important than the fact that the collaborators belonged to ‘‘our
own’’ nation. In that case, accommodation with the ‘‘alien’’ could be compared with
a personal sacrifice for the sake of the good of the nation.
If we decide that ‘‘good’’ rule and life are the important values, when personal
dignity is respected and personal ideas and goals promote ordinary life practices,
then we would have another basis for evaluating the regime as well as the choices of
people living under Soviet conditions. In this case, however, it would be inevitable
to admit that nationality cannot simply be taken as the first principle (or the first
good), thus guaranteeing that decisions and choices in favor of the nation were good
in and by themselves. As the poet Jusˇkaitis stated straightforwardly: ‘‘Whoever
entered the party for the sake of rescuing the nation colluded with all crimes of the
party. Therefore this rescue concerned only him and those like him by means of
manipulation of the culture of the past in order to create a myth about themselves as
the only saviors of the nation and, in this way discrediting all those who wanted to
rescue the nation by other means’’ (Jusˇkaitis 1992, p. 66).
The objective of the ‘‘nation as the good’’ might be likened to a Kantian
hypothetical end. These ends are very important to people. They require personal
effort; however, they must not be taken for categorical or moral ends. To give the
status of an ‘‘absolute good’’ to such an end could lead to the justification of bad
means. That would cause a morally confused situation, when bad means might be
applied for the sake of the good. Kant states that the good will can never be in
conflict with itself. The only possible end of the good will can be defined, according
to Kant, only in the negative, as independent of any existing object. The needs of a
rational being as the subject of free will are the only possible object of moral action:
‘‘a rational being himself must be made the ground for all maxims of actions and
must thus be used never merely as means but as the supreme limiting condition in
the use of all means, i.e. always at the same time as an end’’ (Kant 1981, p. 43).
Kant’s consideration makes clear that there is a very big danger in the tendency to
make ‘‘the good of the nation’’ a moral basis for justifying an action. In the name of
the nation it is easy to exploit human beings and restrict their freedom.
The non-nationalist perspective enables detecting the good and the evil that is
invisible from the perspective of a mere nationally based good. It can help to detect
the right profile of personal responsibility in order to ensure the moral renewal of
society and substantial dissociation from Soviet reality.
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Between free will and historical predestination
The following dilemma of post-Soviet morality is concerned with the interpretation
of the historical role of the declaration restoring Lithuanian independence. As any
event in the field of historical phenomena it can be interpreted at least in two ways.
On the one hand, it can be stated that the declaration was only a link in the chain of
‘‘naturally’’ occurring, historically determined events, such as the politics of
Gorbacˇev, the favorable international situation, and various others. On the other
hand, it might be claimed that the declaration was the manifestation of the people’s
free choice. The first interpretation is evident, but is the latter alternative practically
possible?
Kant argues that freedom of action is possible in the world of natural necessity.
He claims that only at first sight does the situation of free action appear to be
contradictory. The solution of the ‘‘antinomy’’ between freedom and natural
necessity derives from the self-consciousness of an acting person. If he considers
himself as a rational being and acts freely, then his action is not caused by sensuous
impulses and is free from natural necessity: ‘‘And when he thinks of himself as
intelligence endowed with a will and consequently with causality, he puts himself
into relation with determining grounds of a kind altogether different from the kind
when he perceives himself as a phenomenon in the world of sense (as he really is
also) and subjects his causality to external determination according to laws of
nature’’ (Kant 1981, p. 57). For present purposes it is important to note that if a
human being thinks of himself not [in a two-fold way] as a split being, but merely as
a natural creature, he is responsible for his moral negligence and weakness. The
ignorance of this [two-fold situation of] split of the human being can by no means
provide a basis for (moral) justification of one’s (active or passive) adjustment to
natural necessity.
Soviet morality undermined the value of individuality and the person in the life
of society, because it was based on deterministic thinking. The individual was but a
means of reaching the ultimate ‘‘good state’’ of society. The Soviet people were
guided towards this end by the Party, which took decisions in accordance with
natural determination. In such a situation an individual’s choices are without
positive importance. The display of subjective free will is unwanted, because it can
disturb the objective natural evolution towards the supposed good end.5
The way we choose to interpret the course of history is of huge moral
significance. Each perspective points to a different evaluation of choice in any
particular situation. The argument from the natural course of events is compatible
with the moral justification of collaboration with the Soviet regime. If the regime is
the outcome of an inevitably ‘‘natural’’ process, there is no point in wasting one’s
energy in opposing it or exerting oneself to the breaking point. However, if a person
can influence the course of history, his moral duty is to act according to his/her free
will.
5 The importance of this theme for contemporary Russia is confirmed by the fact that in the conference
‘‘Revisiting Perestroika—Processes and Alternatives’’ the theme of the idea of history was most
important for philosophers. See the presentations of Timur Atnashev-Mirzaints ‘‘The enlightened
language of Perestroika: Politics-as-history’’ and Sergei Prozorov ‘‘Perestroika and the ‘End of History’’’.
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For example, in the case of Lithuanian independence it might be argued that
restoring independence did not mean a radical break with the past, and, what is
more, that it took place not on March 11, 1991, but much earlier. Algis Samajauskas
points out that the fight for the independence of Lithuania began already in 1953
when Lithuanian functionaries attempted to decentralize the Soviet economy,
establishing in 1957 a Lithuanian council for the economy: ‘‘That was only the first
step to the economic independence of Lithuania. Quite a lot of time and effort was
needed before the step could be taken’’ (Samajauskas 2005, p. 75). In following this
version of events, it might be stated that the Lithuanian functionaries began to fight
for the independence of the state already in Stalin’s times, though they combined
this struggle with the repression of people who resisted the regime.
The attractiveness of the ‘‘natural course’’ of events was witnessed symbolically
by the distribution of special medals that the members of the Supreme Council of
the Lithuanian SSR awarded themselves prior to the absolute success of Sa˛ju¯dis in
the elections of 1990. The flag of the independent pre-Soviet Lithuanian state and
the inscription ‘‘Lithuanian SSR’’ were portrayed on the same picture. This
combination symbolized the role of the Soviet Supreme Council and its vision of
‘‘new’’ Lithuania: No break was anticipated in the natural course of events. The
‘‘new reality’’ to come seemed to be the same Soviet order, decorated with signs of
pre-Soviet life. The fact is that the symbols of independent Lithuania were
forbidden and its manifestations were severely persecuted in Soviet times. Partial
legalization of some of the attributes would have meant merely the procrastination
of the old condition of semi-truth, double-thinking, and double-feeling.
Today the idea of the ‘‘natural course of events’’ is represented by the argument
that ‘‘nothing has changed,’’ that there is no break with the Soviet past. The
argument is quite popular in attempts to justify collaboration. The statement of
the ‘‘natural course’’ of history is usually supported by the circumstance that the
declaration of the independent democratic state did not of itself change the essence
of life, and that democracy is not free of all kinds of errors. One statement that
supports this view is that the Soviet world did not differ that much from the
democratic order that is likewise repressive and not free of imperfections. Attempts
to find proof for this approach led to a search for evils in the recent political and
social order of independent Lithuania equated with those that were dominant in
Soviet times.
People who earlier occupied leading positions in the Communist party quite often
state that nothing essential has changed. As Lionginas Sˇepetys, former long-serving
Minister of Culture and one of the signatories of the declaration of restoration of
independence, declared as early as 1991, concerning equality between the two
orders, the Soviet regime and the newly established order: ‘‘Once, when talking
about the problems of creative work, I said that to preserve ourselves from drastic
external censorship we should exercise an internal one... Later this phrase was
remembered and criticized. I said it to make trouble. Is this not the way that even the
journalists of our public TV behave? They show that today still there are things that
we have to forbid to ourselves’’ (Sˇepetys 1992, p. 375).
To prove that ‘‘nothing had changed’’ it might be maintained that the government
makes mistakes today just as it did earlier, that its work is far from perfect, that
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some norms can be related to the restriction of freedom, that censorship also plays a
repressive role. It might even be supposed that the situation has worsened, with
greater threats to social norms, national identity, and personal morality.
Vytautas Jakelaitis, former deputy minister of Culture, made every effort to
organize song and dance festivals. He points out that in Soviet times to feel pride in
being a Lithuanian was greater than later. The feeling had been stimulated by
national achievements in sport, culture, poetry, and theatre. He argues that today
threats to national identity are coming from Europe. They are more insidious than
they used to be, and lie in the glitter of mass culture, futile amusement, and the cult
of sex: ‘‘However, there are people who already understand that it is dangerous for
us to melt into the pot of European nations. This is why the natural, vital feeling of
struggle for national singularity, the preservation of language and culture, that
Lithuanians have cherished for centuries, has appeared once again and is gaining in
strength’’ (Jakelaitis 2002, p. 160).
It is easy to dispose of such arguments. Firstly, there is no doubt that the
democratic possibility to choose demands responsibility and moral maturity. The
lack of moral consciousness is nevertheless not a good argument for imposing the
standards of a single morality on society. Ideological pluralism marks the difference
between democracy and totalitarianism and warrants the personal freedom of not
having to submit to the world-view of the majority.
Secondly, it is obvious that even if control over the public sphere exists, which
appears similar to that of Soviet censorship, it is not total or centralized. Past
censorship can hardly be justified by the fact that the present public sphere has its
limits. There is no doubt that a human being and society cannot live without some
form of normativity. To ignore this necessity means erasing the difference between
ethical norms that are necessary for healthy social life and ideological censorship.
The view that ‘‘nothing has changed’’ has a huge moral impact. It removes the
necessity of dealing critically with the Soviet period and its practices of daily life. It
also reduces to a minimum personal responsibility for choice, including the choice
for truth and a free social order. From this point of view, such a-historical categories
as the good, the true, and even liberty lose their absolute (or ideal) value and are
made relative to a historical context.
The confusion of these two possible perspectives is characteristic of post-Soviet
Lithuania, and perhaps of the entire post-Soviet world. It harms the solidarity of a
society, distorts an adequate attitude to the past, and makes the borderline of the
democratic state ambiguous.
Through violence, propaganda, and the form that the social order acquired,
Soviet morality entered into the essence of thinking and acting. It came to
expression in a specific prevailing mode of thinking about the world, in the
evaluation of things and behavior. It also forged a peculiar type of mass-subject
known by the popular name of homo sovieticus. The Soviet norm of life was to mix
truth with deceit, to erase the boundary between politics and social life, to resign
oneself to double thinking and double-acting.
The habits of ordinary life alter more slowly than legal and political patterns.
Soviet morality is not a sort of historical or ideological relic that left only slight
traces in the life of contemporary Lithuania. The Soviet value system did not
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disappear instantly. Although external stimuli and the centralized world-view of the
old days have gone, nevertheless Soviet moral landmarks, modes of reflection, and
ideals survive. They shape and orient people’s consciousness, their attitude towards
other people and the world, and their disposition to daily problems.
In contact with democratic forms of life, these habits beget tensions that are
characteristic of post-Soviet society. Even today constant monitoring of social
phenomena is required in order to detect and disclose Soviet-type practices of
interpreting human relations. Some believe that the renewal of post-totalitarian
society is related more to the ‘‘natural’’ change of generations than to a moral
confrontation with the past. This view has its truth; still it is based on a presumption
that the new generation will have no personal experience of the Good Old Life.
However, the fact is that this generation can absorb habits, practices, and the
morality of the past without having a personal image of it.
Moral evaluation is based on free will and cannot derive from any natural
process. Without a very specific evaluation of the Soviet world it would be
impossible to understand the implications of the democratic present and the
meaning of Lithuanian political independence. Insensibility to moral facts is
conducive to understanding the transformation of a particular society within the
Soviet world as a kind of ‘‘natural’’ process, evolution or destiny beyond human will
and choices, and beyond any personal import. On the other hand, the hypothetical
backslide from democracy and the restoration of the previous totalitarian order
could also be characterized in terms of ‘‘natural necessity,’’ obviating any personal
responsibility.
Finally, we can answer the original question: What is the meaning of
perestrojka? Today perestrojka is a double-edged thing. If perestrojka was the
beginning of the chain of events that destroyed an order based on distorted morality
and defective understanding of ‘‘what is ours’’ and ‘‘what is alien,’’ and that
promoted a new vision of the good, it has immense positive personal and societal
significance. In the name of perestrojka so understood it makes sense to struggle for
liberty and moral renewal. If, on the other hand, perestrojka led to the destruction
of, or merely shook, the former ‘‘good’’ solidarity and order, then it has quite a
different import. If the name Perestrojka is understood in this way, it might be
tempting to return to the sources of the totalitarian order and to look for other, more
up-to-date ways of incorporating the ideas of the fathers of the Russian Revolution.
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